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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEGGY BEZNER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs 
CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS, 
INC., a Corporation, and 
BERT HARRY, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
Case No. 14119 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff to rescind a 
contract for the purchase of a dry cleaning business for 
fraudulent misrepresentation and for termination of a lease 
agreement for a breach by defendants. Defendants filed a counter-
claim seeking a judgment for payments claimed due on the contract 
for the purchase of the dry cleaning business and for delinquent 
rent payments under the lease agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict 
in favor of plaintiff by special verdict. (R. 40-41). Plaintiff 
filed a motion for judgment on the verdict in the Third District 
Court, Earnest F. Baldwin, Judge, entered a judgment in favor 
of plaintiff in the sum of $10,670.00 (R. 29-30). Defendants1 
motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, or in the alternative, 
for a new trial, was denied (R. 33-34). Defendants have appealed 
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the judgment on the verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests the Court to sustain 
the special verdict of jury in favor of plaintiff with instructions 
to the Lower Court to increase the judgment of the Lower Court 
on the verdict to include all sums paid on the principle portion 
of the purchase contract by plaintiff to defendants under the 
contract rescinded. Respondent also requests that the Court 
reverse the Lower Court on the issue of breach of lease with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff against 
the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent takes exception to the facts set forth by 
appellant, and therefore restates the facts of the case. 
Respondent, Peggy Bezner, came to Salt Lake City, Utah, in June 
of 1972, from Kansas City, where she had been employed by Hercules, 
Inc., and not from Omaha, Nebraska, as stated by appellant in 
their brief (T. 84). Prior to coming to Utah, she wrote to a 
Mr. Zorn in the fall of 1971, about buying new equipment for a 
dry cleaning shop (T. 85). Mr. Zorn, in replying to Mrs. Bezner's 
inquiry, told her of existing dry cleaning businesses that were 
for sale (T. 86). When Mrs. Bezner arrived in Salt Lake City, 
Mr. Zorn took her to see dry cleaning businesses that were for 
sale. When Mr. Steadman arrived in Salt Lake City, from Kansas, 
in August, 1972, Mr. Zorn took both Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman 
to see the businesses he had shown Mrs. Bezner, one of which 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was the In-and-Out Sixty Minute Dry Cleaners owned and operated 
by defendant, Continental Dry Cleaners (T. 7, 8, 9, 86). Mr. Steadman 
had operated a part time carpet, drapery and upolstery business 
in Kansas, and wanted to continue in this type of business. Mr. 
Steadman was interested in investing in a business with Mrs. 
Bezner and was looking at dry cleaning businesses with her (T. 7). 
Mr. Zorn was the owner of Alliance Equipment Company which was 
in the business of selling dry cleaning equipment and had sold 
the equipment to Continental Dry Cleaners for the In-and-Out Sixty 
Minute Dry Cleaners (T. 104, 208, 210). 
Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman expressed some interest in the 
In-and-Out Dry Cleaners, and on or about August 24, 1972, Mr. 
Zorn introduced both Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman to Mr. 
Bert Harry, the president and principle stockholder of Continental 
Dry Cleaners (T. 14, 87, 174). At this initial meeting, Mr. Harry 
told Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman that the asking price for the 
In-and-Out Cleaners was $40,000.00. Mr. Steadman asked Mr. Harry 
how the price was established, and Mr. Harry said that the business 
was grossing at that time $1,000.00 per week, and the price 
included approximately $31,000.00 in equipment, inventory and 
goodwill (T. 15, 88). During this first meeting there was 
discussion about Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman operating self-
service gas pumps in connection with the dry cleaning business. 
Mr. Harry represented that the possibility existed of establishing 
a self-service station (T. 15-16, 89-90). 
A second meeting took place between Mrs. Bezner, Mr. Steadman 
and Mr. Harry on August 26, 1972, at the Continental Plant located 
at 5th South and 7th East, in Salt Lake City (T. 17). At this Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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meeting Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman made an offer to purchase 
the In-and-Out Cleaners for $35,000.00. Mr. Harry flew into 
a rage and said it was absolutely out of the question (T. 18). 
Mr. Harry again told Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman that the price 
was $40,000.00, and that this price represented the fact that 
the business was doing a substantial volume of $1,000.00 per 
week (T. 18, 91, 92). Mr. Harry then proposed a partnership 
arrangement with Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman. This proposal 
was immediately rejected by both Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman 
(T. 18, 90). The possibility of self-service gas was again 
discussed at the second meeting, and Mr. Harry provided Mrs. 
Bezner with the name and telephone number of an oil company 
representative. He also represented that the gas tanks were 
still there buried under the ground, and that the building 
which has the cleaning business had been operated as a service 
station (T. 19, 90, 163, 164). Mr. Harry claimed that he 
showed a lease between Continental Dry Cleaners and the prior 
owner of the service station to Mrs. Bezner at this meeting, 
and that Mr. Bezner, the husband of Mrs. Bezner, who was not 
present at any of the meetings, was supposed to have pointed out 
that there was a restriction in the lease concerning the operation 
of a service station (T. 163, 164). The terms of purchase were 
also discussed, should Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman agree to buy 
the In-and-Out Cleaners (T. 21, 89). 
During the meeting with Mr. Harry at the Continental Dry 
Cleaners Plant, both Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman requested to 
see financial records concerning the operation of the cleaning 
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business. Mr. Harry told Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman that he 
had no accurate records of what the shop was doing in that his 
prior manager was supposed to have been stealing him blind (T. 24, 
43, 91). When Mr. Harry made the representation that he had no 
accurate records of what the shop was doing, his wife, Clair 
Harry, had been operating the In-and-Out Cleaners for 2h to 3 
months, had maintained daily records, and records were kept on 
each store, including the In-and-Out at the main office of 
Continental (T. 175, 176, 202). Mr. Harry explained that he had no 
accurate records of what, in fact, the In-and-Out Cleaners was doing 
because the plant was doing work for other plants owned by Continental, 
was doing Army work of 2,000 pieces per week, and some drapery work 
(T. 177). Katherine Winters, a former employee of Continental 
Dry Cleaners, who had worked at the In-and-Out Plant, testified 
that the work from other plants was the so-called "Army Contract" 
and consisted of less than 100 pieces per day (600 per week at 
an average price per item of .14 cents) (T. 178, 221, 222). 
Mr. Harry testified that the Army Contract was for one year 
beginning March, 1972, to March, 1973 (T. 178). 
It was established by the testimony of Mr. Fannin (T. 63, 64), 
Clair Harry (T. 202, 205, 206), and Katherine Winters (T. 219), 
that daily records of what the shop was doing had been kept from 
the beginning and that Mr. Harry, Mrs. Harry and their sons had 
picked up these daily receipts and daily records from the In-and-Out 
Cleaners and turned them into the main office. Mrs. Clair Harry 
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further testified that she had received instructions to remove 
all records from the In-and-Out Cleaners prior to Mrs. Bezner 
assuming ownership and that the records had been picked up by 
the drivers (T. 201, 202). 
After the second meeting with Mr. Harry, Mrs. Bezner and 
Mr. Steadman agonized over the decision of whether to purchase 
the In-and-Out Sixty Minute Dry Cleaners or to start a new business 
for 2h days (T. 25, 92). Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman decided 
to purchase the In-and-Out Cleaners in reliance primarily upon 
Mr. Harry's representations that the business was grossing $1,000.00 
per week. Also, the fact that they would be able to offer self-
service gas operations with it and that the value of the equipment 
was represented to be $31,000.00, with some inventory and goodwill^ 
that the name was established and the name In-and-Out would be 
advertised and they could trade on the advertising (T. 19, 29, 93). 
A purchase agreement was subsequently entered into between Continental 
Dry Cleaners as Seller, and Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman as Buyer 
(T. 46, 100). However, Mr. Harry never provided Mrs. Bezner or 
Mr. Steadman with a schedule of equipment in connection with 
the purchase agreement (T. 44, 101 and 102). Mrs. Bezner had 
made inquiry about putting in the self-service gas pumps prior 
to taking possession of the business. Around October 10th or 
11th, 1972, after she had taken possession of the business, she 
was informed that she could not operate self-service gas pumps 
in connection with the cleaning business (T. 97, 98, 99). Mr. 
Harry was aware of the fact that self-service gas pumps could 
not be operated in connection with the cleaning business and 
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failed to inform Mrs. Bezner of this fact before delivering 
to her for execution the final contracts (T. 163 and 164). 
Mr. Steadman terminated his partnership with Mrs. Bezner in 
the first week of November, 1912, in that he found that the 
setting up of his carpet, drapery and upholstery cleaning 
business was taking all of his time and he could not devote 
time to the cleaning business (T. 31, 32, 38, 39). Mrs. Bezner 
paid out Mr. Steadman his interest in the business and continued 
to operate the cleaning business until Mr. Harry finally retook 
possession of it (T. 106, 123). 
Mrs. Bezner made numerous attempts to obtain a schedule of 
equipment (Schedule A) from Mr. Harry but was unsuccessful until 
Mr. Zorn provided her with a list of equipment in April of 1973, 
(T. 103, 104). The failure of Mr. Harry to provide a schedule 
"A" of equipment to Mrs. Bezner forced her to request an extension 
on filing her tax returns for the year 1972 (T. 105). The preparing 
of the first financial statements of the operations of the business 
were delayed until May of 1973. It was at this time Mrs. Bezner 
became aware that the business had been grossing only $400.00 and 
$500.00 per week (T. 105). 
In the first three or four months of operation of the 
business Mrs. Bezner encountered numerous difficulties. During 
the first two weeks that Mrs. Bezner operated the business 
considerable money was required to be put into the business 
(T. 106). Mrs. Bezner's mother took ill in the early part of 
November, 197 2, and Mrs. Bezner left the business and went to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-8-
Kansas to be with her mother. Mrs. Bezner went to Kansas for 
a week or more during the month of November and again in the 
month of December, 1972 (T. 31, 107). Mr. Steadman operated 
the cleaning shop during her absence. While Mrs. Bezner was 
away in December, 1972, the cleaning shop was damaged by water, 
from a snow storm that had leaked through the roof (T. 32, 33, 
34, 35, 36, 107). Mrs. Bezner incurred expenses of approximately 
$330.00 in repairing the damages caused by the water that had 
leaked through the roof (T. 108, 109). All of these problems, 
coupled with the problem of trying to get Mr. Harry to repair 
the roof (T. 110); the problems she encountered with regard to 
the business license (T. 114, 115); also contributed to the 
delay in preparing financial statements of the business operations. 
In about the second or third week of June, 1972, Mrs. 
Beznerfs husband, while cleaning the boiler room at the dry cleaning 
shop, found a box containing the business records of the In-and-Out 
Cleaners for the period that Continental Cleaners had operated 
it beginning with the month of February, 1972, through September, 
1972 (T. 115, 116, 121). Mrs. Bezner ran tapes on the records 
to determine the gross business the shop had done for the eight 
month period the records covered, and found that the shop had 
averaged approximately $400.00 per week (T. 117, 118, 119, 121). 
She had attempted to contact her attorney, but was not successful 
until the middle of July (T. 122). That she, after consultation 
with her attorney, authorized her attorney to send a letter to 
Mr. Harry informing him that she elected to rescind the contract 
and tendered back possession of the shop (T. 122, 123, 180). At 
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this time she discontinued payments under the contract of 
purchase on the lease agreement, and began winding down the 
operation of the business. Mr. Harry took no action after receiving 
the letter in July, 1973, informing him that Mrs. Bezner had 
elected to rescind the contract of purchase and requesting that 
he retake possession of the premises until September 23, 1973, 
(T. 180). 
Prior to the time that it was conclusively determined by 
Mrs. Bezner that the representation of Mr. Harry that the business 
was grossing $1,000.00 per week was false, the representation as 
to the value of the equipment as being $31,000.00 had not been 
questioned. It was after the discovery of these records Mr. 
Steadman then questioned the represented value of the equipment 
(T. 48). 
That prior to Mr. Harry retaking possession of the cleaning 
business on or about October 1, 1973, he negotiated a sale of 
it to a Mr. Kiter in August or September of 1973 (T. 73, 74). 
Mr. Kiter testified that Mr. Harry started negotiations for the 
sale of the business to him in July of 1973 (T. 82). The 
appellants in their statement of facts state that Mr. Kiter, 
after he had purchased the In-and-Out Cleaners from Mr. Harry 
and commenced its operations, did $1,100.00 business in one week, 
which was the grand opening week, and that there were 18 weeks 
over $900.00 unaffected by any rise in prices (T. 77-80). The 
appellant is in error, in that Mr. Kiter definitely stated that 
the figures did not take into consideration that he had raised 
prices substantially from the time that he purchased and took over 
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the operations of the business (T. 80). That the price structure 
was different and that the 18 weeks of business over $900.00 
per week were during the entire period from October, 1973, to 
March, 1975, and did not take into consideration the higher 
prices charged for the cleaning and whether the weeks of the 
higher income were in the peak period of the business year or 
the low period of the business year (T. 80). Mr. Kiter 
testified that the business had lost money since he had purchased 
it and that it was not profitable as of March, 1975 (T. 80). 
The Court submitted the case to the jury on special verdict 
(R. 40-41). The Court clearly and properly instructed the jury 
as to the law and the burden of proof of plaintiff as set forth 
in proposition number 1 of the special verdict and as set forth 
in instruction number 20, as well as instruction number 8 (R. 104)f 
number 15 (R. Ill), number 17 (R. 113), number 18, (R. 114), and 
19 (R. 115). The jury clearly and without contradiction answered 
each proposition of the special verdict (R. 40-41), and the 
Court entered judgment on the verdict for $10,000, which was 
the down payment made by Mrs. Bezner on the contract of purchase, 
less rents due defendants under the lease and allowing the 
defendants to retain all additional sums paid by Mrs. Bezner 
as principle and interest under the purchase contract as rental 
for the use of the equipment (R. 33-34, 40-41). 
The Court in proposition number 2 of the special verdict 
submitted the question of waiver to the jury, even though the 
defendants had failed to plead anywhere in their answer or 
counterclaim the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, 
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laches or any other matter constituting avoidance or affirmative 
defense to the action of plaintiff as required by Rule 8(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 127-130). The jury answered 
proposition number 2 submitted to them in the special verdict 
as false, thereby finding that Mrs. Bezner, after she discovered 
the false and fraudulent statement of Mr. Harry "that the business 
was grossing $1,000.00 per week" acted with promptness and 
did not waive her right to disaffirm and rescind the contract of 
sale of the business (T. 40-41). 
POINT I 
REFUSAL TO GIVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION OF DEFENDANTS/ 
APPELLANTS ON THE ISSUE OF WAIVER WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR. 
The appellants assert that the submission of proposition 
no. 2 of the special verdict to the jury without instruction was 
prejudicial error. Respondent takes the position that the issue 
of waiver was not properly raised by appellants, and therefore, 
the refusal of the Court to give appellants requested instruc-
tions, not withstanding exception duly taken, did not constitute 
prejudicial error. Respondent does not take issue with the 
general rule that fraud or misrepresentation may be waived 
and that the defense of waiver, ratification or estoppel to a 
fraud action is clearly recognized in law. However, the 
defense of waiver, ratification or estoppel is an affirmative 
defense which must be plead expressly by the party claiming 
it. The provisions of Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides as follows, to-wit: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively *** estoppel, *** 
laches, *** waiver, and any other matter consti-
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Appellants did not assert in their answer or counterclaim, or 
any other pleadings in this action, the affirmative defense of 
waiver, ratification, laches or estoppel. Nor did the appel-
lants at any time during the trial of this case move the Court 
to amend their pleadings so as to bring the issue of waiver 
before the Lower Court. Thus, the issue of waiver was not 
properly raised by the appellants, and they were not entitled 
to have the issue submitted to the jury. (Siciliano -vs- D. & 
R.G.W.R. Co., 12 U.2d 183; 364 P.2d 413). Rule 12(h) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, to-wit: 
A party waives all defenses and objections 
which he does not present either by motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply, ***. 
The provisions of Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides, to-wit: 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for 
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, coun-
terclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto 
if one is required, ***. 
In Thomas -vs- Braffet's Heirs, 6 U.2d 57, 305 P.2d 507, the 
Court said, 
"It is no doubt true that Rule 8(c) requires 
a party to set forth his affirmative defenses 
and matters constituting avoidance; *** It is 
al^o true that generally a failure to plead an 
affirmative defense results in its waiver and 
excludes it as an issue in the case." (Emphasis Added) 
Therefore, the submission of proposition no. 2 without the 
requested instruction of appellants would not constitute re-
versible error, (Anderson -vs- Bingham and Garfield R. Co., 
117 Utah 197, 214 P.2d 607), the defense having been waived for 
failure to plead. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-13-
Appellants do not take issue with the language of proposition 
no. 2 and that the same was not understandable to the jury. In 
Shupe -vs- Menlove, 18 U.2d 130,417 P.2d 246, (1966), the Court 
held that if the language of instructions to jury is such that 
issues are understandable and facts are ascertainable to resolve 
issues, the trial court's failure to give instructions requested 
by defendant will not constitute reversible error. The facts of 
this case were readily ascertainable and clearly established that 
Mrs. Bezner acted with reasonable promptness after she learned 
that the cleaning business had not grossed a $1,000.00 per week 
as represented by Mr. Harry. The first three months of operation 
of the business by Mrs. Bezner was fraught with difficulties in 
that additional money was required to be put into the business 
for supplies and she commenced operation of the business at a slow 
time of the business year. Mrs. Bezner was required to be away 
from the business during the months of November and December, 
1972, to be with her mother who had taken ill. The preparing of 
financial statements for the operation of the business for the 
year 1972 was delayed until May, 1973, by the fact that Mr. Harry 
failed to provide Mrs. Bezner with a schedule of equipment. Mrs. 
Bezner discovered the records of the cleaning shop in June, 1973, 
which then clearly established that the business had never grossed 
$1,000.00 per week as represented by Mr. Harry. She then took 
action and in July, 1973, sent a letter to Mr. Harry telling him 
that she elected to rescind the contract and tender back the 
business to Mr. Harry. Mr. Harry, after receiving the letter of 
July, 197 3, took no action to retake possession of the business 
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until October, 19 73. However, Mr. Harry commenced negotiations 
to sell the cleaning shop to Mr. Kiter in the latter part of 
July or the first part of August, 1973, and did in fact sell the 
shop to Mr. Kiter in August, 1973. This action on the part of 
Mr. Harry could be construed to be constructive retaking of the 
business as early as August, 1973, with actual possession by 
October 1, 1973. The jury properly answered proposition no. 2 
in light of all of these facts which were clearly ascertainable 
to the jury, and these facts and circumstances would clearly 
support the answer of the jury to proposition no. 2. 
Trial by jury is a right fundamental and is sacred to the 
citizen and once it has been granted and a verdict rendered, such 
verdict should not be regarded lightly nor overturned without 
good and sufficient reason and judgment should not be disturbed 
merely because of error. (Bowden -vs- D. & R.G.W.R. Co., 3 U.2d 
444, 286 P.2d 240). Generally in any lawsuit of several days 
duration, counsel can usually find matters upon which he may 
claim error. The reviewing Court will not reverse on mere error, 
but only if it be substantial and prejudicial to the extent that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that unfairness or injustice 
has resulted. (Lamb -vs- Bangart, U.2d ; 525 P.2d 602 (1974). 
Where, as in this case, both parties had fair and full opportunity 
to present their contentions and the evidence supporting them to 
the Court and jury, all presumptions are in favor of the validity 
of the verdict and the judgment. In order for the verdict to be 
overturned, there must exist errors which are substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is reasonable likelihood 
+-Vi^+- f h o r a c n l f w n n l r l ha\7& h p p n H i f f p r p n t i n -hhp> ^ h s p n p p o f p r r O I . 
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(Rowley -vs- Graven Brothers, 26 U.2d 448, 491 P.2d 1206; Burnson 
-vs- Strong, 17 U.2d 364, 412 P.2d 451; Gordon -vs- Provo City, 
15 U.2d 287, 391 P.2d 430). 
Should this Court determine that the refusal of the Lower 
Court to give defendants1 requested instruction was error, then, 
this Court must determine whether the error or irregularity was 
such that there is a reasonable likelihood to believe that in 
its absence there would have been a result more favorable to 
the appellants. In answering this question, the Court must survey 
the whole evidence and after so doing the question must be an-
swered in the negative, then there is no justifiable basis for 
reversal of a judgment. (Rowley -vs- Graven Brothers, (supra.). 
The Court, in the case of In Re Richards Estate, 5 U.2d 106, 297 
P.2d 542, submitted the case to the jury by giving them only three 
interrogatories and directing them to place an "X" opposite the 
proposition with which they agreed. The trial judge refused to 
give proponents requested instructions. This Court held that 
the refusal of the Lower Court to give instructions was not basis 
for reversal., unless the jury was insufficiently advised of the 
issue they were to determine, or it appears that they would have 
been confused or mislead to prejudice. Appellants state that 
the only question raised by their Point I on appeal is whether 
the jury was entitled to be given some guiding instruction on 
the issue of waiver. That the fact that the Lower Court failed 
to instruct the jury as to the legal effect of their finding 
on proposition no. 2 was error. This does not meet the test 
of the above cited cases where the Court properly instructed the 
jury as to the proper burden of proof on each proposition not 
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specifically requiring the burden of clear and convincing evidence 
and clearly instructed the jury on the elements necessary to be 
proved by respondent to support a finding of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation by clear and convincing evidence. The refusal of the 
requested instruction of appellants by the Lower Court would have 
merely stated the legal effect of the answer to proposition no. 2, 
and therefore, was not prejudicial error where the substance 
thereof was contained in the instructions given by the Court, 
specifically in proposition no. 2. (Hardman -vs- Thurman, 121 Utah 
143, 239 P.2d 215). In reviewing the evidence as a whole, the 
refusal to give defendants requested instruction was not error 
where appellants were required to plead affirmatively the defense 
of waiver, ratification or estoppel, and failed to do so; and there-
by, waived this defense. The substance of the requested instruction 
was given by the Court in proposition no. 2 with proper instruction 
as to burden of proof required in reaching the answer. The special 
verdict of the jury should be affirmed and the request of the ap-
pellants to reverse or set aside the verdict of the jury should be 
denied. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE SPECIAL VERDICT 
OF THE JURY OF FRAUD BY DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS. 
Appellants, during the course of trial, motioned the Lower 
Court to dismiss the action of respondent in that the evidence, 
in the opinion of appellants, was insufficient to establish 
fraud. (T. 172-174). The Lower Court denied the motion of 
appellants and submitted the case to the jury under proper 
instructions as to all of the elements of fraud necessary to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be proved by respondent and instrucing the jury thoroughly that 
they must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. (R. Ill, 
113-116). The juryf without contradiction, answered each propo-
sition of the special verdict. (R. 40-41). In the case of 
Lynch -vs- MacDonald, 12 U.2d 427, 367 P.2d 464, this Court said, 
"That the Supreme Court had the duty to review evidence in the 
light most favorable to trial Court's finding where judgment was 
rendered in part on conflicting evidence." The Supreme Court 
affirmed the Lower Court's finding of fraud. 
The question as to whether or not fraud has been established 
by clear and convincing evidence is usually for determination by 
the trial of fact. In Condas -vs- Adams, 15 U.2d 132, 388 P.2d 
803, this Court held that evidence was sufficient to present a 
jury question as to whether the landlord had misrepresented to 
tenants the quantity of hay which had been produced from the 
land per year and as to whether he had misrepresented the water 
supply available for the land. The fact situation in the Condas 
-vs- Adams, supra, case is very similar to this case. The 
owner of land represented that the land offered for lease would 
produce 9 0 tons of hay per year. The leasee later obtained 
proof that the land had not produced 90 tons of hay in the years 
prior to entering into the lease. Mr. Harry represented to the 
respondent that the cleaning shop was grossing approximately 
$1,000.00 per week, but he did not have accurate records of what 
the shop was doing. (T. 24, 43, 91). At the time Mr. Harry 
made the representation that he had no accurate records of what 
the shop was in fact doing, his wife, Clair Harry, had operated 
4-h^  Qhnn for 7M to 3 months, and had maintained daily records 
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which were sent to the main office of Continental Dry Cleaning. 
(T. 175-176, 202). Mr. Harry, although he denied he had repre-
sented that the shop was doing $1,000.00 per week, attempted to 
explain that the lack of records was due to the fact that his 
former manager was stealing from him and that he was doing plant 
work for other plants and work on an army contract which was not 
included in the shop's daily records. (T. 177). Mr. Harry tes-
tified that the army work constituted 2,000 pieces per week. 
Katherine Winters, a former employee of Mr. Harry, testified that 
the army work consisted of 100 pieces per day at an average of 
$.14 per item. (T. 178, 221, 222). Mr. Fannin testified that the 
drapery work was included in the daily receipts and completely 
dispelled Mr. Harry's claim of charge accounts not being included 
in the daily records. (T. 70-71). Mr. Fannin also testified 
that the shop averaged $400.00 per week during the time he was 
its manager, and there never was a $1,000.00 week. (T.67-68). 
The daily records of the shop were picked up by Mr. Harry, Mrs. 
Harry and the drivers and kept at the main office of Continental 
Dry Cleaning. (T. 63-64). This was also confirmed by Mrs. Harry 
and Katherine Winters. (T. 202-206, 219). Mr. Harry represented 
that the price of the business was based upon $31,000.00 of 
equipment and the fact the shop was grossing $1,000.00 per week. 
(T. 18, 91, 92). That these representations were relied upon 
by Mrs. Bezner in purchasing the business. (T. 19-29, 93). That 
she agonized over the decision for 2h days. (T. 25, 92). Mr. 
Zorn, who received a commission for the sale of the business, 
said that the selling price was determined by how much money it 
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grossed in a year. (T. 212). The representation that the business 
was doing between $400.00 and $500.00 per week would not have 
supported the $40,000.00 selling price under Mr. Zorn!s testimony. 
In fact, Mr. Zorn admitted that he had told Mrs. Bezner that the 
cleaning shop's break even point was $500.00 to $600.00 per week, 
not that the shop was doing $500.00 per week. (T. 213-214). Mr. 
Zorn further contradicted himself by stating that the cleaning 
shop could do $1,000.00 to $1,500.00 per week by raising prices, 
not on increased volume. (T. 216). 
Plaintiff/respondent established by sufficient and competent 
evidence each of the essential elements of her alleged cause of 
action for fraud and deceit to make out a prima facie case of 
liability, and in so doing, the Court properly submitted the 
matter to the jury under proper instruction for its decision. 
(Oberg -vs- Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229) . The evidence 
presented on the issue of variance between what the cleaning 
shop was actually grossing and what the shop grossed as repre-
sented by Mr. Harry and on the issues of disparity in business 
experience between appellants as sellers and respondent as buyer, 
and Mrs. Bezner!s reliance on Mr. Harry's representations, was 
sufficient to take the case to the jury. (Lewis -vs- White, 2 U.2d 
101, 269 P.2d 865). 
The instructions given to the jury by the Lower Court, prin-
cipally instructions numbers 8, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20, follow 
very closely the guidelines set down by the Supreme Court in 
Stuck -vs- Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 P.791; 
and Lewis -vs- White (supra.), if anything, these instructions Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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were more favorable to the appellants than the facts justified, 
and therefore, should not be heard to complain. (Motter -vs-
Bateman, 18 U.2d 335, 423 P.2d 153). The evidence presented 
clearly supports the verdict of the jury in finding that the 
appellants fraudulently misrepresented the business to Mrs. 
Bezner. Substantial weight must be given to the juryfs deter-
mination when it clearly appears that the jury's findings were 
based on the application of the standard of clear and convincing 
evidence required by law, and therefore, the jury verdict must 
stand. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT'S AWARD TO DEFENDANTS OF REASONABLE RENT 
FOR THE EQUIPMENT PURCHASED UNDER CONTRACT WAS ARBITRARY 
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Lower Court, in entering judgment on the verdict, 
allowed defendants/appellants to retain all installment pay-
ments made by respondent, Mrs. Bezner, under contract of 
purchase as the reasonable rental value of the equipment that 
was to have been purchased under the contract rescinded by Mrs. 
Bezner. (R. 33-34, 29-30). In 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Pur-
chaser, § 565, it is stated: 
As in other cases of rescission, the vendee is 
ordinarily required to restore the status quo, 
insofar as he has received any benefit, as a con-
dition of his right to rescind; but he is not 
required to put the other party in the same 
situation in which he was before the contract, 
where the latter has rendered it impossible by 
the nature of his fraud or other act, ***. 
It is generally recognized that upon rescission of a contract 
of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a return of all money paid 
on the purchase price. (Heichemer -vs- Petersen, 75 Utah 107, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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283 P. 435; Horiwitz -vs- David K. Richards & Co., 20 U.2d 232, 
436 P.2d 794; Bethhe -vs- Bain, Ore., 240 P.2d 958). Mrs. Bezner 
paid a total of $12,000.00 under the contract on the purchase 
price of the cleaning shop. Mr. Kiter testified that he pur-
chased the shop from Mr. Harry in August, 1973, for $28,000.00, 
the balance owing on Mrs. Beznerfs contract at the time she 
made her election to rescind the same.' (T. 74). That the equip-
ment at the time Mr. Kiter purchased the cleaning shop from Mr. 
Harry was in excellent condition and well worth the price of 
$28,000.00. (T. 79, 81-82). In addition to the payments on 
the principal amount of the contract, Mrs. Bezner paid interest 
totalling $1,719.00. (R. 33). 
Admittedly, the law recognizes that appellants would be 
entitled to some compensation for the use of the equipment by 
Mrs. Bezner, prior to her discovering the fraud upon her and 
her election to rescind the contract. (See Eastman -vs- Overman, 
11 U.2d 258, 358 P.2d 85; Case Credit Corp. -vs- Stark, Wash., 
392 P.2d 215). However, defendants/appellants made no claim for 
rentals in any of their pleadings, nor did they present any 
evidence as to what a reasonable rental for the equipment would 
be for the period it was used. The giving of $3,719.00 as 
rental for the equipment to the defendants/appellants by the 
Lower Court, without the benefit of testimony as to what in 
fact was a reasonable rental, was arbitrary and was not supported 
by any evidence whatsoever. It is respectfully submitted that 
respondent, Mrs. Bezner, should be allowed to recover back by 
law the amount paid on the contract of purchase, the sum of 
$12,000.00, and the defendants/appellants retain the interest 
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payments in the sum of $1,719.00 as reasonable rental for the 
equipment in light of the fact that there was no testimony 
before the Court as to what constituted a reasonable rental 
for the equipment. Therefore, the judgment on the verdict 
should be amended accordingly. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO REFUSE TO SUBMIT THE 
FACTUAL QUESTION OF BREACH OF LEASE TO THE JURY. 
Plaintiff/respondent in her complaint claimed that the 
defendants/appellants had breached their lease agreement by 
failing and refusing to repair water damage caused by water 
that had built up on the roof of the premises and leaked down 
through a seam in the parapet that had separated. (R. 141, 228). 
The testimony of Mr. Stedman and Mrs. Bezner was uncontradicted 
as to the water damage that had occurred and Mrs. Bezner incurred 
expenses in the sum of $330.00 to repair said damage. (T. 32-
36, 107-111). Mr. Bezner testified that the drain on the roof 
in the lower area of the roof was raised two to three inches and 
the water had to rise that height to get into it and that there 
was a screen over it. When the water rose to reach the level of 
the drain, it would run in behind the flashing and parapet, which 
was not sealed. That he investigated personally and observed 
where part of the flashing had been sealed, but it had pulled 
loose, and therefore, allowed the water to run down into the 
cleaning shop. (R. 226-228). Mr. Harry instructed Mr. Stedman 
to call Layton Roofing for the purpose to come out and correct 
the leaking problem and undertook to pay for what services and 
repairs Layton Roofing in fact rendered. This could certainly Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Harry. It was also undisputed that Mr. Harry had prepared the 
lease agreement in connection with the contract of purchase of 
the In-And-Out Cleaners. (T. 100-102). The Lower Court con-
sidered the contract of purchase and the lease agreement as 
two separate contracts, but also stated that they were inter-
dependent and could not separate the two. The Court raised the 
question at the time of trial that if one of the contracts could 
be rescinded by fraud or a breach occurred which would warrant 
the rescission of the contract, then both contracts could be 
rescinded in that they were interdependent. (T. 172). Mr. Kiter 
testified that he had experienced the same leaking problem on 
two separate occasions since purchasing the cleaning shop from 
Mr. Harry in August, 1973. (T. 75). 
In the case of Bullfrog Marina, Inc. -vs- Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 
501 P.2d 266, the Court stated: 
Where two or more instruments are executed 
together by the same parties contemporaneously, 
***, in course of the same transaction, and 
cover the same subject matter, they will be read 
and construed together so far as determining 
respective rights of the parties, even though 
they do not in terms refer to each other. (Emphasis 
Added) 
There is no dispute that the lease agreement was a part of the 
entire transaction between the parties and was entered into 
simultaneously with the contract for the purchase of the clean-
ing shop. Respondent submits that the rescission of the contract 
of purchase for fraud warrants a recission and cancellation of 
the lease in that they were interdependent. A rescission and 
cancellation of the lease should have resulted in an award of 
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by reason of the water damage. 
Appellants succeeded in convincing the Lower Court that 
the provisions of paragraph 6 of the lease agreement relieved 
them of any responsibility or liability for damages suffered 
by Mrs. Bezner due to the leaking roof. Paragraph 6 of the 
lease agreement reads as follows: 
That the party of the first part shall not be 
liable for any damages occasioned by failure to 
keep said premises in repair and shall not be 
liable for any damage done or occasioned by or 
from plumbing, gas, water, steam or other pipes 
or sewage, or the bursting, leaking or running 
of any washstand, tank, water closet or waste 
pipe in above, upon, or about said building or 
premises, nor from any damage occasioned by 
water arising from acts or neglect of co-tenants 
or other occupants of the same building. 
It is the position of respondent that the Court should have ap-
plied the general rule of ejusdem generis in construing the 
provisions of paragraph 6 quoted above in making its determina-
tion as to whether or not appellants would have been liable for 
the damages occasioned by the water that had leaked into the 
cleaning shop. (U.S.F.&G. -vs- Tomlinson-Arkwright Co., Ore. 
141 P.2d 817; Vogel -vs- Cobb, Okla. 141 P.2d 276, 148 ALR 774; 
Trego -vs- WaKeeney State Bank, Kan. 519 P.2d 743). 
The lease agreement contained conflicting paragraphs in 
that paragraph 13 of said lease agreement required appellants 
to keep the premises and exterior of the leased building in 
good condition and state of repair. Paragraph 13 of the lease 
agreement reads as follows: 
Party of the first part (Continental Cleaners) 
agrees to keep the premises and exterior of the 
leased building in good condition and state of 
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As a general rule of law, where the lease agreement is drawn 
by the appellants, which is the undisputed fact in this case, 
conflicts in the lease agreement are to be construed most 
strongly against the landlord (appellants) where a question 
of conflicting meaning arises. (Wolfe -vs- White, 119 Utah 
183, 225 P.2d 729). Generally an ambiguous lease is construed 
most strongly against the lessor on the theory that he is 
the party using the language thereof. (Powerline Co. -vs-
Russells, Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P.2d 906) . Thus, the 
scrivener-lessor becomes accountable for his words, which he 
uses in his lease agreement in case of doubt. (Sine -vs- Rudy, 
27 U.2d 67, 493 P.2d 299) . In the case of uncertainty as to the 
meaning of a contract, it should be construed most strictly 
against its framer. (Seal -vs- Tayco, Inc., 16 U.2d 323, 400 
P.2d 503). Inasmuch as the lease agreement was drawn up by the 
appellants through their attorney, the law requires it to be 
strictly construed against appellants, and any conflict in the 
terms and conditions of said lease agreement should be construed 
against appellants and in favor of the respondent, Mrs. Bezner. 
(Wingetts -vs- Butters, 28 U.2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007). The fact 
that there was a direct conflict and contradiction in the terms 
of the lease agreement clearly raised a jury question as to a 
breach of the lease agreement on the part of Continental Dry 
Cleaners, which should have been submitted to the jury for its 
determination as triers of the fact. Respondent contends that 
the conflict in the provisions of the lease agreement created 
an ambiguity and the terms of the lease agreement should have 
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it. (Guinand -vs- Walton, 22 U.2d 196, 450 P.2d 467; 25 U.2d 
253, 480 P.2d 137; Wingetts -vs- Butters (supra.). It is 
respectfully submitted that the Lower Court errored when it 
refused to submit the issue of breach of lease and the ques-
tion of damages to the jury, and awarded to the appellants judg-
ment for the sum of $600.00 for lease payments for the months 
of August and September, 1973, in light of the fact that the 
lease agreement was an integral part of the contract of 
purchase and could well have been considered to have been 
rescinded along with the contract of purchase; and for the 
further reason that the lease agreement contained a direct 
conflict in its terms and construction of the meaning of the 
conflict should have been construed directly against appellants, 
they being the party who had their attorney draw their lease 
agreement and contract of purchase. Respondent requests that 
the Court reverse the Lower Court on the issue of breach of 
lease with instructions to enter judgment in favor of respondent 
against appellants for rescission of the lease agreement, and 
awarding to respondent damages in the sum of $350.00 for repair 
of the premises and damages occasioned by water, that being a 
direct responsibility of the appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
The special verdict of the jury should be affirmed in that 
no prejudicial error resulted to appellants by the refusal of 
the Lower Court to give appellants requested instruction in 
light of the fact that the substance of the requested instruction 
was given by the Court in the language of proposition no. 2 of 
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the special verdict. Further, the issue of waiver was not 
properly before the Lower Court in that appellants failed to 
plead it as an affirmative defense as required under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore, waived the same. 
The evidence of fraud, viewed as a whole, was more than suffic-
ient to justify and support the verdict of the jury against 
appellants by the applicable standard and burden of proof and 
in view of the detailed instructions on the issue of fraud 
given by the Lower Court to the jury. Substantial weight must 
be given to the jury's determination and it is clear that the 
standard of clear and convincing evidence was met and the special 
verdict of the jury should be affirmed. 
Respondent was entitled to recover back all funds paid to 
appellants on the contract of purchase of the cleaning shop as 
a matter of law. The giving of reasonable rents to the appel-
lants equal to the amount of the installment payments paid on 
the contract of purchase exclusive of the original down payment 
by the Lower Court was arbitrary and was not supported by the 
evidence where appellants made no claim for rental value of the 
equipment and presented no evidence as to what the reasonable 
rental value for the equipment would be during the time respond-
ent operated the cleaning shop. The judgment on the verdict 
of the Lower Court should be amended to include all amounts 
paid by respondent on the purchase price of the contract, allow-
ing appellants to retain only the sum paid as interest as 
reasonable rent for the use of the equipment. Further, the lease 
agreement should be declared as rescinded together with the 
purchase agreement, and respondent be awarded iudament aaain.qf Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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appellant, Continental Dry Cleaners, for the amount of the 
repairs to the cleaning shop. In the alternative, the special 
verdict of the jury should remain in full force and effect, and 
the judgment on the verdict, as requested to be amended, should 
remain in full force and effect, and the issue of breach of 
lease and the question of damages associated therewith be re-
manded to the Lower Court for further .hearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. H. FANKHAUSER of 
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKEAUSER & BEASLEY 
Attorney for Respondent 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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